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New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini: A Rational United 
States Supreme Court Ruling on the Rights of 
Freelance Authors? 
Mili Kamlesh Vakil* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 2001, the United States Supreme Court, in New York 
Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini1 issued an unequivocal ruling supporting the 
rights of freelance authors. Tasini dealt with parent companies of 
periodicals that had sold freelance-authored work to electronic 
databases without providing additional compensation to the freelance 
authors. The Court found that the companies’ actions violated 
§ 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Collective Work 
Privilege”).2 More specifically, the Court held that the Collective 
Work Privilege does not permit print publishers to provide copies of 
freelance authors’ articles to electronic databases without the prior 
consent of the freelance authors.3  
This Note contends that the Supreme Court correctly applied the 
Collective Work Privilege in determining freelance authors’ 
electronic distribution rights and highlights the negative implications 
that the Court’s ruling will have on both freelance authors and the 
electronic media industry. Part I of this Note provides background 
information on copyright law in the United States, specifically the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Copyright Act” or the “Act”).4 Part II 
 
 * B.A., 1998, Washington University; J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University 
School of Law. This Note is dedicated to Kamlesh N. Vakil, Malka K. Vakil, Kevin K. Vakil, 
and Samir J. Sheth for their constant love, support, guidance, and encouragement. Also, much 
thanks to all those who put in an inestimable amount of time helping me produce this piece. 
 1. 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2001); 533 U.S. at 506.  
 3. 533 U.S. at 506.  
 4. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
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examines the Tasini case from its inception to the Supreme Court’s 
decision, examining the key facts and the relevant portions of the 
district court and court of appeals decisions. Part III analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Collective Work Privilege in 
Tasini. In particular, Part III will discuss the legislative history and 
the debate that ensued when enacting the Collective Work Privilege 
as well as the Court’s understanding of Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the Collective Work Privilege. Part IV examines the 
implications of the Court’s ruling, specifically the ethical and 
economic impact the Court’s decision will have on the publishing 
industry, on freelance authors, and on the public. Finally, Part V 
discusses whether the Supreme Court correctly decided Tasini, and to 
what extent the decision really favors freelance authors’ rights. To 
the extent that the Tasini decision may potentially conflict with what 
it intended to do—that is, favor freelance authors’ rights—Part V also 
addresses ways in which to avoid this conflict. 
I. THE GOALS AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT 
ACT OF 1976 
Copyrights are one of the principal modes of intellectual property 
protection.5 Intellectual property protection began with the advent of 
the printing press, which enabled mass production and distribution of 
artistic and literary works.6 Copyright protection has evolved and 
developed as a means to not only encourage publishing, but also to 
encourage learning.7 The United States copyright system protects 
 
§§ 101-803 (2000)). 
 5. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1-2 (2d ed. 2000). Essentially, intellectual property law developed as a 
means to protect ideas that “exist in the mind and work of humans.” Id. at 1. 
 6. Laurie A. Santelli, Comment, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and Publishers 
in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 253, 257 n.20 (1998) (citing 
Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors’ Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995)) 
(stating copyright protection was not necessary before the invention of the printing press 
because of the difficulty of copying and mass producing authors’ works).  
 7. In essence, copyright protection is afforded to authors in order “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See 
also MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 352 (stating that the purpose of copyright protection is to 
“achieve an optimal balance between fostering incentives for the creation of literary and artistic 
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authors against unauthorized copying of a wide range of artistic and 
literary expression.8  
To receive copyright protection, the artistic or literary expression 
must be original and in a tangible form.9 If the expression meets these 
requirements, 17 U.S.C. § 106 grants the author exclusive rights to 
the expression.10 Not only does United States copyright law allow a 
copyright holder protection against unauthorized copying, but it also 
entitles the holder to transfer ownership of his copyright,11 make 
derivative works,12 and control the sale and distribution of the work.13 
 
works and the optimal use and dissemination of such works.”); Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. 
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939) (stating that copyright protection affords “greater 
encouragement to the production of literary works of lasting benefit to the world.”). 
 8. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 23, 27. For example, the U.S. copyright 
system covers everything from books to computer software to artistic portraits. Id. 
 9. Id. at 27; Santelli, supra note 6, at 260 n.33 (indicating that an example of an 
expression in tangible form includes an author’s thoughts written on paper). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001) states:  
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
any of the following:  
 (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
 (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
 (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
 (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; 
 (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and  
 (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
Id. However, the owner’s exclusive rights are subject to exceptions such as 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2001) (the “fair use privilege”), which permits the use of copyrighted work “for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research . . .”  
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001). An owner’s exclusive rights are divisible and transferable. 
See, e.g., Yuri Hur, Note, Tasini v. New York Times: Ownership of Electronic Copyrights 
Rightfully Returned to Authors, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 70 (2000). See also infra note 
18 and accompanying text. 
 12. MERGES ET AL., supra note 5, at 27. The difference between “derivative works” and 
“collective works” is crucial to understanding copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) defines a 
collective work as “a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a 
number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
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Prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 197614 an author 
risked losing his copyright if he published an article in a collective 
work.15 In addition, the doctrine of copyright “indivisibility” 
prevented an author from assigning the right of publication to a 
specific periodical.16 In 1976 Congress addressed these problems by 
revising the Copyright Act of 1909.17 The resulting Copyright Act of 
1976 eliminated the doctrine of copyright indivisibility and structured 
an author’s copyright into many exclusive rights that could be owned 
or transferred individually.18 The Act also provided that no more than 
one notice is needed for the collective work to protect a freelance 
author’s rights.19  
Finally, Congress included in the Act the Collective Work 
 
assembled into a collective whole.” Derivative works, although similar to collective works in 
that they use preexisting copyrighted works, “differ from collective works . . . in that [they] 
include an original contribution to one or more of the preexisting works, [thus] transforming or 
adapting the material to form a new work.” Hur, supra note 11, at 72. 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 101-803. 
 15. For example, if a publisher failed to print a copyright notice in the author’s name 
when publishing the author’s article in a collective work, the author’s copyright was threatened. 
New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 494 (2001) (citing Copyright Act of 1909 
§ 18, 35 Stat. 107a) (“Pre-1976 copyright law recognized a freelance author’s copyright in a 
published article only when the article was printed with a copyright notice in the author’s 
name.”). The Copyright Act defines a “collective work” as one “in which a number of 
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a 
collective whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
 16. Under the doctrine of indivisibility, “when a copyright notice appeared only in the 
publisher’s name, the author’s work would fall into the public domain, unless the author’s 
copyright, in its entirety, had passed to the publisher.” 533 U.S. at 494 (citing A. Kaminstein, 
Divisibility of Complaints, Study No. 11, in Copyright Revision Studies Nos. 11-13, prepared 
for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1960)). An author’s 
copyright, in its entirety, could pass to the publisher by a contract, but absent an express 
contract, a court may find that the author “tacitly transferred” the entire copyright to the 
publisher, and that the publisher “hold[s] the copyright in ‘trust’ for the author’s benefit.” Id. at 
494-95. See also 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 10.01[C][2] (2000). 
 17. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch.320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, superseded 
by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982). According to the Tasini Court, Congress revised the 
Copyright Act of 1909 to “‘clarify and improve [this] confused and frequently unfair legal 
situation with respect to rights in contributions.’” 533 U.S. at 495 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738).  
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2001) (addressing the elimination of the doctrine of indivisibility 
and transfer of ownership); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001) (outlining an author’s exclusive rights). 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2001).  
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Privilege, which defines the rights that exist in a collective work.20 
Specifically, the Collective Work Privilege provides that a copyright 
in an individual contribution is discrete from a copyright in a 
collective work as a whole.21 In addition, the Collective Work 
Privilege provides that in most circumstances, publishers own 
copyrights in collective works, but not in individual articles.22 As a 
result, the Copyright Act of 1976 establishes a more equal balance 
between authors’ rights and publishers’ rights than did the Copyright 
Act of 1909.23 
Overall, the United States copyright system provides a means by 
which the benefits afforded to individual authors eventually lead to 
significant public gain.24 
II. THE TASINI FACTS 
Tasini is the first Supreme Court ruling relating United States 
copyright law to electronic publishing.25 In Tasini, the lead plaintiff, 
Jonathan Tasini, along with other authors26 (the “Authors”) alleged 
that their copyrights in twenty-one articles (the “Articles”) written for 
the New York Times Company (the “New York Times”), Newsday, 
 
 20. The Collective Work Privilege states: 
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright 
in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. 
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the 
owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the 
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular 
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in 
the same series.  
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2001). As a result of the Collective Work Privilege, a “publishing company 
could reprint a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine, and could reprint an 
article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not 
revise the contribution . . . itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different 
magazine or other collective work.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1976, at 122-23, reprinted in 
U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659.  
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
 22. Id. 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1976, at 122, reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659.  
 24. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 25. Hur, supra note 11, at 66 (“Tasini was the first case to merge copyright law with 
electronic publishing and media rights transfers.”). 
 26. The other authors involved in the case are Mary Kay Blakely, Barbara Garson, Margot 
Mifflin, Sonia Jaffe Robbins and David S. Whitford. 533 U.S. at 488.  
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Inc. (“Newsday”) and Time, Inc. (“Time”) (collectively, the “Print 
Publishers”) had been infringed by the articles’ inclusion in 
electronic databases.27 At the time of publication, the Authors 
possessed registered copyrights in each of the Articles, and the Print 
Publishers had registered copyrights in each edition of the periodical 
in which the Articles initially appeared.28  
When the Articles were published, the Print Publishers had an 
agreement with LEXIS/NEXIS, an electronic database that stores 
information in a textual format.29 The agreement granted 
LEXIS/NEXIS the text of and the right to copy and sell any article 
that appeared in the Print Publishers’ periodicals.30 Thus, 
LEXIS/NEXIS places these articles on its electronic database, and a 
subscriber to LEXIS/NEXIS may perform a computerized search for 
articles and can then view, print, or download articles.31 
The New York Times had a separate licensing agreement with 
University Microfilms International (“UMI”).32 The agreement 
allowed for the reproduction of New York Times articles on two CD-
ROM products, the New York Times OnDisc (“NYTO”) and General 
Periodicals OnDisc (“GPO”).33 
In December 1993, the Authors filed a civil action alleging 
copyright infringement.34 The Authors claimed that placing their 
Articles in the LEXIS/NEXIS, the NYTO, and the GPO databases 
(collectively, the “Electronic Databases”) violated their copyrights.35 
LEXIS/NEXIS, UPI (together, the “Electronic Publishers”), and the 
 
 27. 533 U.S. at 487.  
 28. Id. at 489. 
 29. Id. LEXIS/NEXIS is the owner and operator of NEXIS, which contains a variety of 
articles from numerous periodicals and newspapers dating back many years. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. (“The display of each articles includes the print publication (e.g., The New York 
Times), date (September 23, 1990), section (Magazine), initial page number (26), headline or 
title (‘Remembering Jane’), and author (Mary Kay Blakely).”). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. Like LEXIS/NEXIS, NYTO is a text-only system that only contains articles from 
the Times, and offers an index of these articles. GPO contains articles from approximately 200 
publications, and, unlike LEXIS/NEXIS and NYTO, it is an image-based, rather than a text-
based system. Id. GPO CD-ROMs show each article exactly as it appeared on the printed pages, 
and also provides an index and abstracts of all the articles in GPO. Id. at 490-91.  
 34. Id. at 491-92. 
 35. Id. at 491. 
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Print Publishers defended the action by asserting the Collective Work 
Privilege.36 Both parties moved for summary judgment.37  
While, the Authors and the Print Publishers agreed that the 
periodicals, in print form, constituted collective works under the 
Copyright Act, they disagreed as to whether the articles, as they 
appeared in electronic databases, were part of a collected work.38 The 
Authors moved for summary judgment on the basis that the 
reproduction of the Articles in the Electronic Databases violated their 
rights under the Copyright Act.39 The Authors argued that the Print 
Publishers went beyond the narrow scope accorded to them by the 
Collective Work Privilege when they sold the Authors’ articles for 
reproduction in the Electronic Databases.40 In particular, the Authors 
contended that the Electronic Databases did not legitimately revise 
the Print Publishers’ collective works, but rather improperly used the 
Authors’ individual contributions.41  
The Print Publishers moved for summary judgment on the basis 
that the Authors had authorized the Print Publishers, through formal 
contracts, to sell the Authors’ individual contributions to the 
Electronic Publishers.42 The Print Publishers further argued that, 
notwithstanding the formal contracts, their actions were still in 
compliance with the Copyright Act.43 Specifically, the Print 
Publishers maintained that they exercised their rights under the 
 
 36. Id. The Print and Electronic publishers defended the action by asserting that they 
possessed “the reproduction and distribution privilege accorded collective work copyright 
owners by [the Collective Work Privilege].” Id.  
 37. Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 804, at 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 38. Jonathan T. Elder, Legal Update, Supreme Court To Hear Arguments On Electronic 
Database Copyrights For Freelance Journalists, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 406, 407 (2001).  
 39. 972 F. Supp. at 806.  
 40. Id. at 809. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 806. Time relied upon “the ‘first right to publish’ secured in its written contract 
with plaintiff [David S.] Whitford.” Id. at 809. “Newsday relie[d] upon the check legends 
authorizing the publisher to include [the Authors’] articles ‘in electronic library archives.’” Id.  
 It is worth noting that that the district court disagreed with the Print Publishers on this 
matter. 972 F. Supp. at 811. In particular, the court found that “there [was] no basis for holding 
that the Newsday check legends effected an unambiguous and timely transfer of any significant 
electronic rights in [the Authors’] articles.” Id. Because the district court disposed of the issue 
of express transfer of electronic rights, this Note focuses solely on the Collective Work 
Privilege and the rights it accords. 
 43. Id. at 806. 
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Collective Work Privilege in order to produce revised versions of the 
Authors’ contributions.44 Thus, the district court decided only 
whether or not the Electronic Publishers’ “revisions” were authorized 
under the Print Publishers’ Collective Work Privilege.45 
On August 13, 1997, the district court granted the Print 
Publishers’ motion for summary judgment and denied the Authors’ 
motion.46 The district court first held that the Collective Work 
Privilege permits a print publisher to “transfer” a collective work 
from one medium to another (i.e., from a print format to an electronic 
format), without violating the Copyright Act.47 The district court also 
held that the Collective Work Privilege provides the Print Publishers 
with the right to transfer some of their exclusive rights in the 
Authors’ individual contributions to the Electronic Publishers.48 
Finally, the court held that placing the Articles on the Electronic 
Databases merely constituted “revisions” of the collective works.49 
 
 44. In particular, the Print Publishers maintained that the Electronic Databases “merely 
generate ‘revisions of [the Print Publishers’] collective works [as per the Collective Work 
Privilege],’ and therefore do not usurp [the Authors’] rights in their individual articles.” Id. at 
809. 
 45. Id. at 812. 
 46. Id. at 827.  
 47. The district court reasoned that the Collective Work Privilege “contains no express 
limitation upon the medium in which a revision can be created.” Id. at 817. Rather, the court 
stated that “‘any revision’ of a collective work is permissible, provided it is a revision of ‘that 
collective work.’” Id. at 817-18. 
 48. The district court held that the term “privilege,” as used in the Collective Work 
Privilege, “underscore[s] that the creators of collective works have only limited rights in the 
individual contributions making up their collective works; the term does not indicate that the 
creators of collective works are limited in exercising those few rights, or ‘privileges,’ that they 
possess.” Id. at 816. The Court thus concluded, “to the extent that the electronic reproductions 
qualify as revisions under [the Collective Work Privilege], the [Print Publishers] were entitled 
to authorize the [Electronic Publishers] to create those revisions.” Id.  
 49. The district court reasoned: 
Because a collective work typically possesses originality only in its selection and 
arrangement of materials, it is to be expected that, in a revised version of such a work, 
either the selection or arrangement will be changed or perhaps even lost. This is 
precisely what has happened here. Lacking the photographs and page lay out of the 
disputed periodicals, NEXIS and [NYTO] plainly fail to reproduce the original 
arrangement of materials included in the [Print Publishers’] periodicals. By retaining 
the [Print Publishers’] original selection of articles, however, the [Electronic 
Publishers] have managed to retain one of the few defining original elements of the 
[Print Publishers’] collective works. In other words, [the Electronic Databases] carry 
recognizable versions of the [Print Publishers’] newspapers and magazines. For the 
purposes of [the Collective Work Privilege], then, [the Print and Electronic Publishers] 
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The Authors appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.50 
On February 25, 2000, the Second Circuit unanimously reversed 
the district court decision and remanded the case with instructions to 
enter judgment for the Authors,51 holding that the Electronic 
Databases were not revisions of the Print Publishers’ collective 
works.52 The Second Circuit chose not to rule on the issue of the 
transferability of the Collective Work Privilege,53 holding only that 
the inclusion of the Articles in the Electronic Databases exceeded the 
scope of the Collective Work Privilege, and therefore violated the 
Authors’ rights under the Copyright Act.54 On June 25, 2001, the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit decision.55  
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF THE COLLECTIVE WORK 
PRIVILEGE 
The Supreme Court, in Tasini, held that the Collective Work 
Privilege helped an author maintain his copyright in his article by 
regulating the publisher’s copyright in its collective work.56 While 
 
have succeeded at creating ‘any revisions’ of those collective works. 
Id. at 824-25. 
 50. Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 51. Id. at 172.  
 52. The court noted that “in reproducing the [Print Publishers’] collective works in the 
electronic databases, the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the preexisting collection 
[were] lost, thereby depriving it of ‘revision’ status.” Id. at 168-69.  
 53. Id. at 165.  
 54. Id. at 166. See also Hur, supra note 11, at 88.  
 55. New York Times Co, Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). See infra Part III for a 
detailed discussion of the Court’s anaysis. 
 56. The Court stated: 
Essentially, [the Collective Work Privilege] adjusts a publisher’s copyright in its 
collective work to accommodate a freelancer’s copyright in her contribution. If there is 
demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new collection, the Copyright Act 
allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand; after authorizing initial publication, 
the freelancer may also sell the article to others. 
Id. at 497 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 229 (1990)). The Court also noted that the 
congressional purpose in preserving an author’s copyright in his contribution would not be 
satisfied “if a newspaper or magazine publisher were permitted [by the Court] to reproduce or 
distribute copies of the author’s contribution in isolation or within new collective works.” Id. at 
497. See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1976, at 122.  
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the Print and Electronic Publishers in Tasini argued that the 
reproduction and distribution of the Authors’ Articles in the 
Electronic Databases fell within the Collective Work Privilege,57 the 
Court disagreed, stating the Publishers’ actions diminished the 
Authors’ exclusive rights under section 107 of the Copyright Act.58  
To determine whether the Authors’ Articles were part of a 
revision of a collective work, the Court focused on the Articles “as 
presented to, and perceptible by, the user of the [Electronic] 
Databases.”59 The Court found that the Electronic Databases failed to 
plainly reproduce and distribute the Authors’ Articles either “as part 
of” its original edition or as a “revision” to that edition.60 The Court 
defined “revision” to mean a new version as within the scope of the 
Collective Work Privilege.61 The Court urged that the Articles may 
be viewed as parts of a “novel compendium,”62 and stated that each 
version of the periodical in that novel compendium only 
corresponded to a small portion of the expanding database.63 Thus, 
 
 57. 533 U.S. at 499. 
 58. Id. at 499. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 59. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2001)) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance 
with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device . . .”). 
 60. 533 U.S. at 499-500 (reasoning that the Electronic Databases “present[ed] articles to 
users clear of the context provided either by the original periodical editions or by any revision 
of those editions”).  
 61. Id. at 500 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1944, 2545 
(1976)) (“‘Revision’ denotes a new ‘version,’ and a version is, in this setting, a ‘distinct form of 
something regarded by its creator or others as one work.”). But cf. 972 F. Supp. at 819-20, 24 
(using broader “substantially similar” test to define “revision”). See also Josh J. May, Tasini v. 
New York Times Co., 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 13, 22-23 (2001) (providing an example that 
criticizes the district court’s interpretation of revision).  
 The district court’s use of the substantial similarity test to define the revision presented an 
unfair burden to freelance authors because it did not consider that while many authors were not 
compensated for their work, the Electronic Publishers compensated the Print Publishers. See 
generally Irene Segal Ayers, International Copyright Law and the Electronic Media Rights of 
Authors and Publishers, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 29, 42 n.63 (1999). To overcome 
this burden, some have suggested an additional test to the substantial similarity used by the 
district court in order to define revision. Id. (citing Alice Haemmerli, Commentary: Tasini v. 
New York Times Co., 22 COLUM.–VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 148 (1998) (suggesting the use of 
“commercial-similarity” and “nature-of-public-access tests”).  
 62. 533 U.S. at 500. The Court defined compendium as the “entirety of works in [an] 
[Electronic] Database.” Id. 
 63. Id.  
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the Court concluded, “[t]he massive whole of the [Electronic] 
Database is not recognizable as a new version of its every small 
part.”64  
In determining whether the Authors’ Articles were part of a 
collective work, the Court examined whether, on the Electronic 
Databases, the Authors’ Articles could be perceived as individual 
articles.65 The Court held if the Authors’ Articles could be viewed as 
individual articles this infringed upon the Authors’ exclusive rights 
under § 106 of the Copyright Act.66 The Print and Electronic 
Publishers urged that transferring work to a different form of media 
does not alter the character of that work.67 However, the Court found 
that the transfer of the Authors’ Articles from periodicals to the 
Electronic Databases did not characterize a “mere conversion”68 
because an Electronic Database user may not perceive the Authors’ 
Articles as part of a collective work.69 The Print and Electronic 
Publishers also contended that the Collective Work Privilege protects 
them because the users of an Electronic Database can fashion their 
search query to retrieve all the articles from a specific periodical 
edition.70 The Court, however, also dismissed this argument,71 
concluding that the Collective Work Privilege did not protect the 
electronic and print publishers from copyright infringement.72 
 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 500-01. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 67. 533 U.S. at 502 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 23). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 502-03 (analogizing the Electronic Databases to an imaginary library that has 
individual copies of articles, rather than intact periodicals). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 70. Id. at 504.  
 71. The Court reasoned that:  
The fact that a third party can manipulate a database to produce a noninfringing 
document does not mean the database is not infringing. Under [the Collective Work 
Privilege], the question is not whether a user can generate a revision of a collective 
work from a database, but whether the database itself perceptibly presents the author’s 
contribution as part of a revision of the collective work. That result is not 
accomplished by these [Electronic] Databases. 
Id. 
 72. Id. at 504-06. 
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IV. ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S 
DECISION 
The Court’s decision in Tasini will have far reaching effects on 
the publishing industry, freelance authors, and the public both 
retroactively and in the future.73 First, because of the Internet’s quick 
and easy access to a wealth of information, the Court’s decision will 
complicate some of the purposes and goals of the publishing 
industry,74 such as providing Internet users with a comprehensive 
library on the Internet.75 In order to avoid copyright infringement 
suits by authors or to avoid royalty payments to authors, publishers 
may choose to remove articles from electronic databases, thus 
depriving the public of a thorough electronic record.76  
Second, the Court’s decision in Tasini will not only inevitably 
cost many print and electronic publishers large sums of money, but it 
will also lead to increased social costs. Although print and electronic 
publishers will withdraw from electronic databases any material that 
may violate the Collective Work Privilege, or any other section of the 
Copyright Act, they will not avoid all copyright infringement 
liability,77 as they may be liable to freelance authors for copyright 
infringement that took place prior to the Court’s decision.78 In 
addition, many innocent parties, such as libraries, will have to endure 
a greater burden and pay a higher price than they did in the past.79  
 
 73. See generally Hur, supra note 11, at 90-91.  
 74. See, e.g., Charles S. Sims & Matthew J. Morris, Tasini and Archival Electronic 
Publication Rights of Newspapers and Magazines, 18-WTR COMM. LAW. 9, 14 (2001).  
 75. See Hur, supra note 11, at 92-93 (noting that the Tasini decision will affect Internet 
users expecting to find website archives and will affect the use of electronic information 
worldwide). 
 76. See id. at 93; Sims & Morris, supra note 74 at 15 (predicting the harm of “wholesale 
deletions” on the public, which would result if the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit 
decision). But cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution 
and Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473, 483-83 (stating that “although some excision from 
the electronic record is possible, the extent of such losses is easily exaggerated”).  
 77. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 494 n.94.  
 78. See Hur, supra note 11, at 92 (relying on Jason Williams, Court Decision for Free-
Lancers Could Leave Gaps in Archives, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 2, 1999, at 5) (“[Tasini] 
could potentially cost publishers millions of dollars by rendering them liable to freelance 
authors. This potential liability results largely from the authors’ retroactive claims of 
infringement on articles posted in electronic archives.”). 
 79. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 494 n.98; Hur, supra note 11, at 90-91 (“Tasini 
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Finally, the Tasini decision may lead to a power imbalance 
between publishers and freelance authors.80 The Court’s decision 
mandates that print and electronic publishers obtain some kind of 
permission from the freelance authors to publish the authors’ articles 
in an electronic database.81 Additionally, the freelance authors could 
demand from the print and electronic publishers hefty compensation 
for their contributions.82 
V. ARE THE FREELANCE AUTHORS REALLY BETTER OFF THAN 
BEFORE TASINI? 
Despite the asserted potential negative effects on the print 
publishing and electronic publishing industries,83 these effects are 
exaggerated. The Court in Tasini correctly interpreted the Collective 
Work Privilege, and therefore correctly decided the issue in favor of 
the Authors. Having affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment in favor 
of the Authors, the Court remanded the case to the district court to 
determine remedies available to the Authors.84  
Thus far, the district court has not provided the Authors with any 
relief for the Electronic and Print Publishers’ copyright violations. 
Since the district court has broad discretion in granting relief to the 
Authors, it should exercise extreme caution in determining the 
appropriate remedies. The district court should necessarily grant the 
Authors damages for the profits earned by the Print and Electronic 
Publishers as a result of the copyright infringement.85 The district 
 
significantly impacts digital products, web sites, or electronic databases created by reference 
books and encyclopedia publishers . . . .”).  
 80. See, e.g., Mark R. Kravitz, Developments in the Second Circuit: 1998-1999, 32 CONN. 
L. REV. 949, 995-96 (2000) (“It remains to be seen what licensing arrangements a publisher 
will, as a practical matter, be able to obtain given the newly-found clout of freelance authors 
and journalists.”); Santelli, supra note 6, at 268-70. But cf. Gordon, supra note 76, at 494-95 
n.98. 
 81. Hur, supra note 11, at 94 (“In order for publishers to continue their electronic 
publishing of freelance works, they must first obtain permission from authors.”).  
 82. See id. at 94; May, supra note 61, at 31. 
 83. See supra Part IV. 
 84. 533 U.S. at 496. The Copyright Act remedies for copyright infringement include 
injunctions, impounding and disposition of infringing articles, damages, and profits. 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 501-510 (2001).  
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2001). 
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court, however, should not grant an injunction86 that halts the use or 
distribution of the Authors’ articles. If the district court grants an 
injunction, it may lead to an ironic situation in which freelance 
authors would have to give up some of their rights in order to grant 
the Publishers permission to use or distribute their articles.87 
Unfortunately, if a permanent injunction is granted, the freelance 
authors will be confronted with a “Hobson’s Choice,”88 which will 
ultimately defeat the Constitutional and Congressional purpose in 
enacting the Copyright Act.89 Essentially, an injunction will deplete 
the public’s access to information because it is relatively easy and 
cost-free to delete or discontinue use of freelance authors’ articles 
from electronic databases.90 An injunction will also thwart a freelance 
author’s publication opportunities, thereby leading to significant 
professional and financial costs. Clearly when the purposes of 
copyright protection were elucidated in the Constitution and in the 
Copyright Act, neither our Framers nor our Congressmen intended 
for anyone to be confronted with this kind of situation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in Tasini is the first to correctly interpret the Collective 
Work Privilege with respect to freelance authors’ contributions to 
parent companies who subsequently sell the contributions to 
electronic databases. The Court obviously favors freelance authors’ 
rights in their artistic and literary expressions. However, the remedies 
that the district court may provide the freelance authors with may or 
may not favor these rights. The district court could remedy the wrong 
by awarding damages to the Authors, while it could worsen the 
 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2001). 
 87. After the Court’s decision in Tasini, the New York Times notified all of its published 
freelance authors that if the Tasini decision affected any of them, those affected authors must 
release the New York Times from financial liability arising out of the Tasini copyright 
infringement suit. Tasini v. New York Times Company, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 300, 352-53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 88. In this scenario, an author must decide between compromising the protection of his or 
her artistic or literary expression or compromising the public’s ability to obtain information 
from new technologies. Id. at 553.  
 89. See discussion supra Part I. 
 90. See Sims & Morris, supra note 74, at 15. 
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situation for the Authors by granting an injunction, because an 
injunction would negatively affect freelance authors’ rights and 
would hamper the public’s access to information. 
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